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I. QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Should the Supreme Court grant Petitioners' Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari? 
II. REFERENCE TO OPINION 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is presently 
contained in 82 Utah Adv. Rptr. 38 (May 13, 1988). 
III. JURISDICTION REQUIREMENTS 
1. The decision by the Court of Appeals was filed on 
May 13, 1988. 
2. An extension of time to file this Response to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted by a justice of this 
Court on August 9, 1988, allowing this Response to be filed on or 
before September 12, 1988. 
3. Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, 
authorized the Supreme Court to transfer to the Court of Appeals 
any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original 
appellate jurisdiction and, further, the Supreme Court has sole 
jurisdiction to grant or deny a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
IV. STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, grants 
to the Supreme Court discretionary power to grant or deny a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari for the review of a Court of 
Appeals adjudication. In addition, Rule 43 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court indicates that a Writ of Certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion and will be granted 
only when there are special and important reasons therefore. 
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V, STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On May 28, 1986, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, one 
of the Judges of the Second Judicial District Court of Utah, 
issued a Memorandum Decision ruling in favor or Respondent Davis 
County and ordering that a Writ of Mandamus be issued requiring 
Clearfield City to issue a Conditional Use Permit to Davis 
County. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed on 
May 28, 1986. 
The appeal of Appellant Clearfield City was originally 
docketed in this Court (No. 86-0343). Later, this Court, 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Ann (1953) as amended, 
transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for what Respondents 
hoped would be a final disposition of the case. The parties 
argued the matter before a three judge panel of the Court of 
Appeals and on May 13, 1988, a decision of the Court of Appeals 
was rendered affirming the decision of the lower Court. 
Petitioners and Appellants, not being satisfied with the decision 
of the District Court nor the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
now request this Court, again, to review the decisions of the 
lower Courts. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Petitioners have set forth in their Petition a lengthy 
Statement of Facts almost identical to the lengthy Statement of 
Facts set forth in their Brief to the Court of Appeals. The 
Petitioners7 Statement of Facts in their Petition for Writ of 
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Certiorari fails to focus on the actual reasons why Clearfield 
City denied the application of Davis County for a Conditional Use 
Permit. Those facts ignored by Petitioners are as follows: 
1. The hearing before the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission lasted approximately two hours. The official minutes 
of the meeting contained no reasons whatsoever for the action 
taken by the Planning Commission. Although Respondent Davis 
County made a formal request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, the Clearfield City Planning Commission refused to give 
any reasons for the denial of the Conditional Use Permit. 
2. Vern Hamblin, the Chairman of the Clearfield City 
Planning Commission, testified one reason he voted against the 
Conditional Use Permit was because of the fear people expressed 
in the Planning Commission meeting that they could not sleep at 
night thinking about the Mental Health treatment facility being 
in the adjoining professional office zone. 
3. Vern Hamblin expressed another reason he voted 
against the Conditional Use Permit was his fear that by placing 
the Mental Health treatment facility next to the Alcohol Recovery 
Center future crime problems could be created. Police Officer 
Nelson had stated at the meeting that the new facility would not 
increase the crime rate. 
4. In addition, Mr. Hamblin feared that by placing the 
treatment facility across the street from the junior high, the 
junior high students might induce the patients of the mental 
health facility to participate in drugs, thus impeding their 
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treatment, or the patients might introduce the students to drugs. 
5. In the Planning Commission meeting, Vern Hamblin 
asked for and obtained a vote of the citizens attending the 
meeting as to whether or not they were in favor of the Planning 
Commission issuing a Conditional Use Permit. Only one person 
voted for the facility and all others in the audience voted 
against it. 
6. The Respondent Davis County appealed the decision of 
the Clearfield City Planning Commission to the Clearfield City 
Council. 
7. The Clearfield City Council met in a secret 
premeeting on October 9, 1984, to which Respondents were not 
invited and in which the Conditional Use Permit was discussed by 
members of the City Council. No minutes were taken in the secret 
premeeting. 
8. Councilwoman Shirley Reed made a motion in the 
public portion of the October 9, 1984, City Council meeting to 
uphold the City Planning Commission and deny the appeal for a 
Conditional Use Permit. 
9. A City Councilman, Ivan Anderson, testified that the 
primary reason he voted against the treatment facility was the 
fear that the people in attendance at the meeting had in their 
hearts and minds. 
10. Mr. Anderson expressed fear that junior high school 
students across the street would "get to" the patients at the 
treatment facility and he acknowledged that he thereby completely 
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ignored the opinion of Dr. Russell Williams, a mental health 
professional and Director of the Davis County Mental Health 
program. 
11. In its Memorandum Decision, the trial Court 
explained that the Planning Commissions refusal to furnish 
written findings or at least provide the basis for its decision 
so that Respondent Davis County could intellectually respond on 
appeal to the City Council, tended to suggest there was no 
rational basis for the Planning Commission's decision. 
12. In its Memorandum Decision the trial Court stated 
that although the Court carefully reviewed the verbatim 
transcript of the public meetings provided by Davis County, it 
found that "nowhere in the transcripts...is there believable 
information or evidence on which the Clearfield City Council 
could have rationally believed that the proposed mental health 
facility would pose any special threat to Clearfield City's 
legitimate interest." 
13. The trial Court concluded that the actions of the 
Clearfield City Planning Commission and the Clearfield City 
Council in denying a Conditional Use Permit to Respondent Davis 
County for a mental health transitional facility were arbitrary 
and capricious and discriminatory and without substantial basis 
in fact. 
14. The trial Court's decision was appealed to the 
Supreme Court, who transferred the case to the Court of Appeals 
for review and decision. 
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15. The Court of Appeals issued its decision on May 13, 
1988, and concluded as follows: 
While the reasons given by the Clearfield City 
Council for denying the permit might be 
legally sufficient if supported, the trial 
Court was correct in concluding that the 
offered reasons are without factual basis in 
the record. What the Court found to be the 
real reason for the action, "public clamor," 
is not an adequate legal basis for the City's 
decision. Therefore, we agree with the trial 
Court that Clearfield City acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in denying the Conditional 
Use Permit for reasons which either had no 
factual basis or were not legally sufficient... 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioners endeavor to persuade yet another Court that 
their secretive decision making process based upon fear and 
public clamor is justified when two previous Courts have ruled 
that the denial of Respondent's request for a Conditional Use 
Permit was arbitrary and capricious. After two days of hearing, 
the trial Court concluded that Petitioners' actions in denying 
the Conditional Use Permit were arbitrary and capricious and 
without substantial basis in fact. The Court of Appeals in 
upholding the trial Court's decision declared, 
While the reasons given by the Clearfield City 
Council for denying the permit might be 
legally sufficient if supported, the trial 
Court was correct in concluding that the 
offered reasons are without factual basis in 
the record. 
Petitioners urge that the trial Court and the Court of 
Appeals ignored any evidence in the record regarding clustering 
or dispersing of Mental Health treatment facilities. Petitioners 
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even suggest that the failure of the Court of Appeals to address 
this central issue is "not only an egregious violation of 
judicial procedure, but also denies other cities and planners the 
opportunity to examine the validity of this argument as it 
relates to their own problems of conditional uses." 
The decision of the Court of Appeals does not deny City 
Planners anything. City Planners and City Planning Commissions 
are not precluded from dispersing or clustering mental health 
treatment facilities, but City Planners and City Planning 
Commissions cannot deny Conditional Use Permits to mental health 
treatment facilities simply because of public clamor. The clear 
message of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals is that a city 
must have believable information or evidence to support a 
rational belief that a proposed mental health facility will pose 
a threat to the city's legitimate interests. The clear message 
from the Court of Appeals to City Councils is that secret 
premeetings of the City Council where the merits of a conditional 
use application are discussed and where information is relied 
upon for the decision will not be tolerated by the Court. 
Clearly, the Court of Appeals addressed the central 
issue relating to disbursing or clustering of mental treatment 
facilities but concluded, 
Even if the reasons given in the motion 
adopted by the City Council might otherwise 
be legally sufficient, see Note 1, supra, the 
denial of a permit is arbitrary when the 
reasons are without sufficient factual 
basis.... 
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Petitioners urge that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals substantially affects nearly all small cities and 
municipalities in Utah. Petitioners urge that the decision of 
the Court of Appeals has held that in cases involving Conditional 
Use Permits it is required that any aggrieved litigant from the 
Planning Commission must appeal such decisions to the Board of 
Adjustment. However, if the holding of the case is that urged by 
Petitioners, the Court of Appeals would have reversed the 
decision of the lower Court and remanded the case with 
instructions for the Board of Adjustment to hear the appeal of 
Respondent Davis County. 
After specifically addressing the question of disbursing 
or clustering mental health treatment facilities the Court of 
Appeals held "...Clearfield City acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in denying the Conditional Use Permit for reasons 
which either had no factual basis or were not legally 
sufficient." Since the statements of the Court of Appeals 
concerning the Board of Adjustments and appeals thereto are 
merely dicta, the Court of Appeals has not decided an important 
question of municipal law which must now be settled by this 
Court. In fact, the ruling of the Court of Appeals as noted in 
its conclusion, is entirely consistent with prior decisions of 
this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is manifestly unfair to Respondents for this Court to 
grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari when two other Courts 
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have already ruled that the action of Petitioners was arbitrary 
and capricious. The mental health treatment facility has now 
been in operation for well over a year without any complaints 
from the City, the school, or surrounding neighbors. Petitioners 
seek to mask their dissatisfaction of the decisions of two other 
Courts by claiming a holding that does not exist. The real 
reason and holding of the Court of Appeals turned on the 
arbitrary and capricious conduct of Petitioners. Respondent 
Davis County, therefore, urges this Court to deny the Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari of Petitioners. 
Respectfully submitted this %tt\ day of September, 
1988. 
Hess 
Chief "Civil Deputy 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to 
the Court of Appeal for the State of Utah and to Craig S. Cook, 
Attorney at Law, 3645 East 3100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84109, this ^fk day of September, 1988. 
Seer C" 
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APPENDIX 
Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
38 B,R. Woodward Marketing ••Collins Food Service 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 CODE*CO Proto. Lflh 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We agree that Woodward, by its conduct, 
waived its, right to incentive commissions 
under the sales agreement with Collins. The 
evidence is incontroverted that Woodward 
was aware, of the existence of its right to 
receive compensation pursuant to paragraph 
3(b) and that it knew such a claim had to be 
documented by a daily saks report and sub-
mitted monthly. Nonetheless, Woodward 
decided to '"roll over and play dead" as it was 
"more than willing to settle for $45,000 a 
year/ It was not until after the relationship 
was terminated that Woodward sought what it 
knew it was entitled to receive during the 
entire course of its employment. Such 
conduct, notwithstanding whatever unexpre-
ssed subjective intent Woodward's principal 
had, unequivocally evinced an intent to waive 
its right to claim the incentive commissions.3 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
decision granting Collins* motion for 
summary judgment. 
Gregory K. OTTO*, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Pamela TV Greenwood, Judge 
•Retail Stores Corp.* 23 F, 
r.r/1937). In th* instant case, 
jtfVe to waiver are undisputed 
5-trial court's conclusion that 
: Woodward waived its claim is 
of taw. See Diversified 
Eqtsfrie*. Inc.v/AfikHcAn S*v. & loan Ass'n, 739 
PMlUh 1136 (.ytakQ. App. 1987) ("Where the 
facts are n o t ^ material dispute, interpretation 
placed thereon by trial,court (x*comes a question of 
law ..„"). 
2. Of course, if* is Collins' position that no such 
commissions ware owed under the contract. A 
timely assertion by Woodward would have permitted 
the parties an opportunity to address the contractual 
ambiguity and adjust the terms to comport with 
their negotiation* and actual understandings. As to 
Woodward's fear that such an inquiry would have 
resulted in termination of the contract, it is inconc-
eivable that Collins, having just entered into the 
contract with Woodward, would have terminated 
the contract if Woodward had sought nothing more 
than its due pufe* the contract. 
I. While tbetrtttfttmrt reached the correct result 
applying the doctrine of waiver, other courts have 
reached the same result, on similar facts, under 
cither an estoppel or contract theory. See, e.g., 
Celmer v. Sdunto, 198 Mont. 271, 645 P.2d 946, 
94§ (1982) (An employee would be estopped from 
claiming compensation for overtime work where he 
failed to report it or to inform his employer that he 
expected compematioo for it until he instituted suit 
after his discharge). Cf. Abraxas v. Horizon Corp., 
07 Ariz. 71f 669 TM 51, 57 (Ariz. 1983) 
fttirrnrinV ilm umnnf •iirm of objection to empl-
oyer's fa&Bt •<* pay: commissions precluded appli-
cation of doctrine that any-course of performance 
acquiesced hi without objection is given great weight 
lsiateil>rc««tfe*nf tmbtguous agreement). 
Cite as 
•2 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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OPINION 
•• M M ni , m , •„ ! „ , i |
 t i , , i . . . 
ORME; Judge: 
Clearfield City seeks reversal of a district 
court order issuing an extraordinary writ in 
the nature of a writ of mandamus. The writ 
ordered Clearfield City to issue Davis County 
a conditional use permit for a group home. 
We affirm. 
FACTS 
On June 25, 1984, Davis County made 
application with the Clearfield City Planning 
Commission for a conditional use permit to 
operate a residential treatment program for 
adolescents and adults suffering from subst-
ance abuse. The proposed site was adjacent to 
another building operated by Davis County, 
known as the Addiction Recovery Center 
(*ARC*). The sale of the property to Davis 
County by Victor Smith had been made 
subject to approval of the County's plans by 
Clearfield City. 
A public hearing to consider the permit was 
held on July 18 by the Clearfield City Plan-
ning Commission. A number of citizens atte-
nded and raised concerns about parking, an 
increased crime rate, and the reduction of 
property values in the vicinity. Concerns were 
also voiced that the use of the property for a 
group home would be incompatible with the 
"residential* nature of the surrounding area. 
The commission denied the application in a 
three 40 one vote, refusing to give any reason 
for its decision. As required by city ordinance, 
U T A H AfWANCRftEFORTS 
_ -i^]i;llW>>dii;'Sefiteittbf-w''i^^ 
flatter consideration deferred to QctojEi||£.'"* -
The OearfWd Ch> P & ^ 
meeting' oe October 9 <t^ O ^ m ^ 
conditional, use pennit. The aearfidd City 
Manager presented two maps to-the GTty 
Council at the pre-meeting which were not 
presented it any public hearing. One map 
identified 'neighborhoods* where the impact 
would be greatest if another group home was 
permitted. Based on the City Manager's ass-
essment, the two facilities combined would 
constitute H * of the neighborhood he iden-
tified. The other ^W^*jtMmfm 
zones and the k*ai<» rf baskT 
within a one raik diameter at topeofrned 
site. These services included the Pioneer 
School for the mentally handicapped* the 
ARC facility, the Cldirfield Convalescent 
Center, and the Division of Family Services 
Center. 
In the formal poakm of the October-9 
meeting, Councilwoman Reed made a motion 
to uphold the Planning Commission's decision 
and to deny the appeal for a conditional use 
permit. The motion ^carried.1 Davh County 
then .&lo&*|ife£K4^ 
the a c t i « * ^ f c * Gity C o ^ ^ 
ning Commission were unconstitutional and 
asking the courHto issue a writ of mandamus 
requiring 
use 
i*Th£x&*mut fonnd that 
in denying the permit was 
lous^dtettattstttc&T; 
basir Jfcincfc: The court upN» 
City zoofaig, ordinance a* 
found ttar the city uncoi 
it because there was no rati 
bash to deny the permit. Qearfi^'i request 
for a *tay^of judgment was siflw^uemly 
denied aadAis appeal followed J 
Before totniii* to the n * ^ 
is noce^arr to review both the pcopcr proce-
dure fo^jadidal review of the-ofey s^ action 
and tbea^pHc^blestandar^of wrtew. 
nuances within, the various 
aoa*ywhjcb 
the authority 
ordinances tp il^mic^al^fe 
ciaJ review of fcc*l zoning pr j 
necessarily d * M M » 3 » J ^ 
sute a<tmmfctrattvc ptdaaftre act is; < y P ^ 
able an interpretation of the enabling Jegt* 
ation, and the provisions of the pertinent iocai 
ordinance.5ee*dk 
A. Review pursuant to state administrative 
procedure act 
Utah's newly created and long overdue 
Administrative Procedures ActK kjtah Code 
a ^ t * t i g ^ 
n i s t r e t i ^ ^ 
January i^ 1 9 ^ 1917
 5 l | u * ^ ^ ^ ^ | 
§315,. it dpes not j ^ y tp j c ^ 
pending at Us tffecav*,date. Sec An$dlv^ 
Board of Review, 750 PJd ^11, 612 nJ2 (Uah 
Ct. App. 19*8). Moreover, untikc in spine 
states, the Utah act applies only to state, and 
not to locaTageiKkM See Vtah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-i(l} f l 9 « £ t i e #tah act specif-
ically excludes application to "any political 
subdivision pf the ^ate^>r any admini^raiivc 
mm of a poU*k^ subtfviston of the, S|aie7 
B. Hrvtew pemaatlft zoning stataie 
Likewbe, ; ^ contmy lo^he c h ^ n g e -
stkm on ^ 
from1 
1ikt 
any dedskto «T 
ttmenf- may -MV&' «r tSa in ta in^ 
plenary action t6t**m 'therefrom 
in' any court of competent jurisdic^ 
tion ...v 
Utah Code Ann, ii^f-15 <»«$: \ 
The city artfe that DUvis^^ttnty did hot 
follow the proper procedure ASr Judicial teview 
of the Qty Cbuncav decision because Oavis 
County *hou& tove ttmimcnced the Vihd df 
In this cite, however* Davis County was not 
in need of revfcr pf a board oTad)ustmcat 
decision. It wu aggrieve*? by action of the 
City Council ifrirtning the decision of the 
Planning Onnmissfcisi. There it so statutory 
recourse siimlar |j^|JO-W 5 tbr review of 
city councfl actie^-Uppareut^ the 
county with no recourse other than to obtain 
review by the traditional nteans of seeking an 
extraordinary writ or, more precisely, appro-
priate relief available where no other adequate 
remedy exists. See Utah R. Civ. P. 658(a), 
0>X3). 
C. Review pursuant to ordinance 
Notwithstanding the unavailability of ftat-
utory irview ipluoiiaiit to §K>*94$, the '&? 
claims, that Davis'County was nonetheless 
required to appeal as prescribed by Clearfield 
City ordinance. The section of the Clearfield 
City ordinance governing the issuance of 
conditional use permits, at least as reproduced 
in our record, provides that appeals from the 
Planning Commission must proceed to review 
by the City Council. Appeals from the city 
council must then be taken to a court of 
competent jurisdiction pursuant to a provision 
similar, but not identical to, §10-9-15. 
That ordinance provision provides, in relevant 
part, with our emphasis added: 
Any person aggrieved by or aff-
ected by any decision of die jBovd 
Of Adjustment -or the City Council 
my $ m and ^  maintain 41 plenary 
•etttp f<* jejicf therefrom in wok 
dnutidif canfrieteDt jurisdiction, 
&^$m£mi&dl in the diarict court, 
the city castnoF«fcer the soope *ad&ppdure 
tor »view nguirtd by. $10-9-1* bkjfopfy 
inserting tlwuwoi*- ^ the City Cowdt^ into 
its ordinance ,^Where a route of review is 
provided by estate statute, a municipality 
lacks the power to alter that scheme. See, e.g., 
Cusbiag rv Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 820 (Me. 
1983). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently found a 
similar procedure invalid because it conflicted 
with Utah's enabling act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§10-9-1, XQ . 11 (1986). Chambers v. 
Smithtidd Otyf 714 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 
1986). The enabling act provides that the leg-
islative body ofuj^tity, such as Clearfield's 
city cqundfcJgMjfa^jM& to regulate zoning. 
hut i^4>iimMmmm *!# paver, th* 
UTAH AD V 
1136. The ordinance at issue m MNuwm 
reouired that variaaoi reauetti be sufatahtodso 
ootn tne ooaitt or^adjusuucBt wet tot |nao* 
ning commission, wto appeal to 'the city 
council. The Court found that th* ekf% pro-
cedures conflicted wkh the enabling act by 
vesting the city council; rather than the board 
of adjustment, with final authority over the 
determination-whether cor not to grant varia-
nces from the zoning ordinances. 714 P.2d at 
1137. See Schcrbd K Stir Uke City Cotp*, 81 
Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (1988) (board of adj-
ustment rather than city council is appropriate 
body to hear zoning appeals from planning 
commission under council-mayor form of 
BOveruBMSBtj* 
Wlffle tie Ctearffctd Oty ordinance differs 
from the one in Chambers, it nonetheless also 
M s to provide for final review of' zoning 
matters by a board of adjustment as required 
by §10-9-15 and endeavors to vest; the City 
Council with the final determination of con-
ditional use permits. A legislative body may 
act as a board of appeals only when the cre-
ation of a board of adjustment is not statut-
orily mandated.4 See 7 Rohan, Zoning and 
Land Use Controls §49.01(51 (1986) <**f the 
creation of a zoning hoard is mandatory, a 
local legislative body cannot reserve unto itself 
the sole power to gram w4eny variances.?) See 
also Schcrbel v, Salt Lake (Sty Corp.* 81 
Utah Adv. R*fx-*,46 (*tl* authority to 
resolve *ming d l^ i4 i |^#rope#"t«rt«e^ 
tive function mfrcy#q»r»*<^btffr* < ^ ) v '*v 
about f 
f
*fj& k* envisioned in 
use peimif 
City 
onsistent 
act Kavmg 4 M » 7 
method of district ^  
that act.* 
Since the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act does not apply to local agencies and this is 
not an appeal pursuant to §10-9-15 *or 
any other stanitoriiy-prescribed scheme, 
Davis County^was entitled to seek.jwfidal 
review through a procedure traditionally used 
where review is not otherwise provide foe 
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civfl Procedure 
recognizes that appropriate reliefujnpgjh&e 
granted'where the jdief sought is 
^•WwfjPiif ^#*^ F^pa^wpa |^ %^ 
board 
A. STANDARD* O? REVIEW AND 
The unique procedural posture of this case 
results in some confusion over the applicable 
standard of review both at the trial court level 
and on appellate review. While the appeal is 
taken from an administrative decision, the 
case found its way to cfistrict court in the 
context of a petition fot an extraordinary writ. 
Thus* the nature of review by the district court 
was a hybrid proceeding involving some ele-
ments of administrative review and some ele-
ments of an independent civil'action. That is, 
the trial court did not limit its review to con-
sideration of the record, 4$ is typically the case 
in reviewing administrative decisions where a 
record is available,, but heard two days of 
extensive testimony from various witnesses as 
is more typical of an independent civil action. 
A. Trial Court Review of Administrative 
Clearfield City argues that the trial court 
erred in handling review of a city council 
decision as, in effect, a trial de novo and that 
the court should have been limited to consid-
eration of whether, on the record, the 
council's action was arbitrary and capricious 
and not supported by substantial evidence. 
The Utah Supra** Court recently addressed a 
similar argument in Xanthos v. Board of 
Adjustment, 685 ?M UB2, (Utah 1984), 
which involved afe*ppeai l& the district court 
lwi«ttH^49\4Ntt^l^^0i^^ decision toy * 
botjtf^*4fcb|ient denying a variance. After 
skm gad ordered the board to grant the vari-
ance. Sab Lake Oft argued, as Clearfield dty 
argues in this case, that the court was limited 
to consideration of whether the boards actkm 
was arbitrary and capricious and not suppo-
rted by substantial evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court defined the scope 
of review contemplated by the terms 'plenary 
action* as used nr §10-9^15. #The nature 
and extent of the wiew depends on what 
happened bdow as reflected by g tine record 
of the proceedings, viewed in the light of 
accepted due process requirements/ Id. at 
1034 (quoting Denver* Rio Grande Western 
R. R. Co. v. Cm&atvWehtt Sewer Improve-
mentDfat,, 4 Utah 2d 105. 2S7 P.2d 884, 887 
(is*s»^ibs^jgjg^^gwtet in ace-
m*i*t*cord 
^^^Mmf^^ mi$w&m^ 
1
 '^^f *fe 
vwme MIWCCWR 
to be w^kmr^^^i^^ ^ f 
order tt> make that determination, the district 
court may take additional evidence so long as 
it is rctcvia* to the issues that were raised ami. 
considered by the board.* Id. at 1035. Seeato 
Hona v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W. 2d 
409, 416 (Minn. 1981); 3 Anderson, American 
Law of Zoning $27.32 (1986) (a court revie-
wing a decision of » local zoning board may, 
take additional evidence if necessary to aid in 
the fair disposition of the case). Xanthos 
involved the question of the proper standard 
of review under §10-9*15, which is not the 
basis for this appeal as explained above. 
However, its reasoning applies at least as 
readily to an action commenced pursuant to 
Rule 65B to secure a writ. 
Even though the record was perhaps more 
extensive In this case tha& ftifci&d in zoning, 
matters, we fmd the trial court was justified in-
receiving additional evidence for at least two 
reasons. First, the tnal court was concerned 
about the secretive nature and lack of any 
record or minutes of the City Council's "pre* 
meeting.' Second, notwithstanding Davis 
County's request, the Planning Commission 
refused to give its reasons for denying the 
permit and the City Council refused to enter 
formal findings in support of its decision. 
Thus, in order to determine whether the action 
taken by the City Council was so unreasonable 
as to be arbitrary and capricious, the trial 
court received additional evidence to ascertain 
what transpired at the pre-c&eetmg and to 
discover the city's actual reasons, for denying 
the permit.7 
ftr AppeBate Review df 
(, lor we nave 
fi the fctfy* 
m t i t w a j 
wkDti. 
thbeoun 
k nonetheless1 precluded froojgfvftig deference 
to the trial « ^ d6cisi^l^ fteietd, it it often 
stated thai aa appellate <Mnt otfes no partic-
ular 4eference to a trial court's prior review 
of particular agency action.9 
See, e.g., Tccbnomcdical Labs, Inc. v. Securities 
Div., 744 P.2d 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 'When a 
lower court has reviewed the administrative decision 
and the court's judgment is challenged ton appeal, 
we review the administrative decision jtst as *f the 
appeal had come directly from the agency/ Id. at 
321 n.l. See also Bcamon v, Utah State fid. of OiL 
Gas& Mining, 675 P.2d 1135,1139 (Utah 19S3>, . 
This doctrine, of course, makes sense only in the 
context of review of agency action an g record. The 
appellate court ordinarily gives no presumptioolot 
correctness to the lower court d ? ? ^ ^«cat^tt« 
tower court's review of the a&nlntoi^^ll^6W% 
taisf AXtinafttf' mote 
#wf*****few: 8ou 
kanlrwhen the tiM xm^'het^ tek^at^Attmt 
witnesses, ai in this om^^mh00m^L 
mindful of the M v a n p | ^ | | ^ f ^ j | ^ ^ f ^ 
779, 779 (Utah 1986). See alio Jensen 
$£fflfywte% 
UTAH ABVANCE REPORTS 
FM JSP. 1 » (Utah !981XC0Wt II 
.advaattfrf posfekm of the trfal UMH- VIUMV n w n w were pcrma* 
caeeteltftlecWofis'), 
lams on lh± adftrinlmeUve record, wegflp Jjii jM • 
tartar deference to the trial coot* Bat fesdftr #*# 
tarns on the testimony of witnesses, we defer to tbe 
trial ceart^ t advantaged position. 
IH. TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
The trial court concluded that the Planning 
Commission's action in denying the conditi-
onal use permit and the City Council's actum 
in upholding the denial were arbitrary* and 
capricious and without substantial basil in 
sing CcMBmisskm and the City PmmiiMifiril"" 
imituuonally applied the appiicabk provisions 
of the zoning ordinance. 
A. Lack of evidence supporting dty'sdedrfen 
In tot memorandum decision, the trial court 
explained that the Planning Commission's 
refusal to furnish written findings or ar least 
provide the basis for its decision so that Davis 
County could intelligently respond on appeal 
to the City Council, tended to suggest there 
was no rational basis for die Planning Com-
mission's decision. With regard to the City 
Council** decision, although the court catef-
ufiy reviewed the verbatim transcript oPthe 
public meetings provided by Davis County, it 
found that •nowhere in the transcripts ;/. if 
ttere believable information or: evidence on 
which the Clearfield City Council 
l#offa%t bdleved dial the 
mostpwu fl«Ned«itestimony 
po«rt over |^ tw<> day Period in an 
ttoestain whaube b*sis for the <*#A 
ac&Mftpiik 
The court found that the pre-meetin| taW 
by the Oty Council on October % although 
•ostensibly- a public meeting, was not an 
Open meeting, yet the merits of Davis 
County's application were discussed and 
council members obviously relied on infortn-
arioitsuppfced in that meeting. The court also 
found that the maps presented and relied upon 
in the prt-meeting were arbitrarily drawn and 
were not presented or explained at the pubtk 
meeting. 
In its findings, the court reviewed A e 
reason* «ugg$stod at trial forite 
#pialofdie permit and found that 
s^rhTtt 
tt^d. 
With regard to the concern over real estate 
\ values, the court fmmd that no studies were 
made and no camions Vere given by profess-
ional itai estate appraisers nor was any cred-
ible evidenos of reduoed property values pro-
duced at the hearings. In a similar vein, two 
professional planners were 
employed by the 
city but iwfther voiced any objection to gran-
ting the application. 
Even If the reasons given in the motion 
adopted by the council might otherwise be 
legally sufficient, see Note 1, supra, the denial 
Of a permit UarbitnftT when the,/e*ic«tff 
lkv$.; fee. V Village of Shtoevitwr 
HWM 320 (Minn. 1981). In Shorcvkw, 
several singte-famfly homeowners objected to 
the use of land in their vicinity for construc-
tion of multiple dwellings. At the public 
fluffing, they expressed concerns about traffic 
problems, reduced property values, and 
density, l W court in Sborcview reviewed these 
reasons and concluded that the ptamiag 
commission'* stated reasons for denying the 
special use permit, an action which was upheld 
by tJ^ ^ty <^unci did noi^$9?t-ff&*»l 
support ia^he 'vague reieryatio^^rtpmwj 
by either the single family owners or the 
eommission members/ /A at 325-The court 
found the rcasom did «©Uii^^ 
*pubfie ^ ,
 W W f _ . r i « . _ . 7 4 r-w^. 
sufficient basis for deny&g the permit. The 
court explained: 
Indeed, there is almost uniform 
public clamor -when any mental 
health, facility, halfway house, .jail 
or p^rison U proposed* The public 
realizes the need for such facilities, 
but they should always be located 
somewhere else .... Citizen oppose 
tkm «t a consideration which nju*t 
be wfij^ed, but cannot be 
i j ^ l ^ d e c i s k m t o d e n y . 
because of its 
ptftnoit the court 
IpDsmty School 
K'adtf^ inwtrators 
' «6^ppo« tiw 
police 
Uu*. 
D»vfr ffflBJ«ffig'M<a* 43 
solicitation of or reliance on tht 
neighboring landowner* ^jlfc 
$hboring landowners may jw '' 
tcriaa for the issuance 
#waluse permit.*, 
In a case factualist, 
one, the 
of the 
t-whmdcterminii*^ 
Mopmcnt permit * &m#' W^Cfcmtf 
Comm'rs v. Teton County Y6mh' Services 
to*, 652 P.2d 400, 411 (Wyo, 1982), te thto 
case, the county commission denied an appli-
cation for a development permit, submitted by 
Youth Services, to use an existing facility as 
an alternative residential treatment center for 
the care and treatment of juveniles in need of 
supervision or emotional and socially hand-
icapped. The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed 
with the trial court that the commission's 
decision had to be set aside since the commi-
ssion found that neighfew jnpposed t*>e; pro-
posed development and ttm i^pomrt couW not 
determine the weight th* 
such ^unautr % "~ " *"* 
decision./d. at 
ha another 
uffitmei 
* <X A] 
:awrit 
the cowty board to 
permit t o aBo* fr to 
treatment facility. The district CTOrtrdehi£3^r 
wnt,*nd the city a p p e a l e d * ^ ^ M t a a e ^ a 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying 
the city's application and reversed th4 bSigffcl 
court and remanded with instructions to isiue 
the writ of mandamus ordering thfc county 
board to issue the conditional use permit, 386 
N.W. 2d at 776. The court in Bstrnunt, noting 
that the failure by the county board to Make 
sufficient findings in support of its decision 
made the court's task of review "highly inip-
|* because *Tt]here is no way to detet-
tatoeJftoni the record ...; what the 
wis when it denied 
facts, and not
 ymc*c emotion or 
local opinion-'*-j6akin« such a 
dedsion. 
?tfi6 Mr'a v. 
2d 335, 34& (j 
• CMcrcte 
«ftre-*£| 
€ZCo*tiaA** 
While the reasons g^ ve*1fy> the aearfieid 
City Counal for denyuV&e permit might be 
legally sufficient if supported, the trial court 
was correct in concluding: that the offered 
reasons are without factual basis in the record. 
What the court found to be the real reason for 
the action, "public clamor/ ia not an adeq-
uate legal basis for the city's decision. Ther-
efore, we agree with the trial court that Clea-
rfield City acted arbitrarily and capriciously m 
denymg the conditional use permit foe reasons 
which either had no factual basts or were not 
legally sufficientsTBe^ause we, gnd;thc decision 
arbitrary and capricious/ we tytve no need to 
consider w b c g i ^ t l p , ^ * * pr$nance w*$ 
unconstitutional on its /ace or a& applied,1*. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's deci-
sion. 
Gregory K. Qtmc Jndg* 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T . Greenwood, fudge 
JudithM. Billings, Judge 
Upon concerns aired by property owners ar the 
puSlic meeting. The court stated that though 
these sentiments may be weighed in a zoning 
decision, "they may not be the sole basis for 
granting or denymg a given permit/ Idr The 
court characterized the county's decision hi 
these terms: 
ftl decision appears to have been 
a response &%P*tite oppose 
This U an insufficient basis 
which t * deny a conditional 
use permit. A county must rely en 
1. The motion referred toihelottfewufe'reasons? 
Clearfield's responsiveness ro com* 
munity and the County'* special needs 
by four structured residential and resi-
dential-type facilities within the radius 
of one mile; and that 11^ of the land 
would be designated to this particular 
type of structured residential .use; and 
that to uphold the Clearfield* master 
plan and zoning ordinance *o minimize 
the changes of the characteristics of the 
neighborhood. 
1 We are^dvised that; 
stay* the 
Smith, 
as might 
large residence to 
the motion 
with 
/renova^ 
the 
^ipose, and has 
continuously operated the treatment facility for 
some two years now. 
3* While some states have specifically made their 
administrative procedure acts applicable to-local 
agencies, at least one sane ha»i*chfty«d the ume 
result through the interpretation of rate of proce-
dure, See, e.g., Board of Catmy, Comas >rs v. Teton 
County Youth Serv* Inc^ « i FM 400,416 *Wyo. 
J9tt). Assuming favorable experience with the Utah 
Adrninistrative Procedures Act, the'tigislafure mayt 
in due course, wish to consider extending Its appH-
cauon to local agencies. 
W'jWwiiPoim 
at t^f^B^c^fitf^H 
in attrndancy were asked to vote on the J 
Ctory one person voted for the facility j " 
fothcaiidicacevfredapnrair. 
It. M noted In seam 4(e) of thH optmoa, the 
dty*s ordinance it inconsistent with generally appl-
icable state 1fef, «t least insofar as it vesta ta thejchy 
conned* rather than a board of adjustment, the final 
word on applications for conditional use permits, in 
that sense* the ordinance is unconsuiutionaj, pader 
the supremacy clause contained in Utah Con«, Art. 
XI. §5. See AUgoot v, Zjuson, 545 P Jtf 530. 532 
(Utahl976K 
tk VtA ***. Rep. 4f 
IN THE 
U T A H COURT OP A P PEAES 
Rkhard F. BRIMLEY, 
Plaintiff *ndApp*tant, 
Joseph S. GASSER, Jn, 
Defendant gad Respondent. 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson n d 
4. The enabling act for city zoning b different from 
the enabling act for county zoning. The county act 
makes the decision to appoint a board of adjust-
ment discretionary with the comity 
rather than mandatory ay under the city 
act. Chamber* v. SmithMd Chy, 714 PM BIS, 
M 37 (Utah 1986). 
5. The county might have premised its attack on the 
City Council's action on the ground that the council 
was not authorized to hear the zoning appeal. See, 
e.g., Scncrbd v. Sail Lake Gty Corp., Si Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 16. It did not do so. Nor does the city 
contend in this appeal that the county should have 
appealed to a body other than the City Council, a 
position it would in any event be estopped from 
asserting. The city's point is that the City Council 
funcaoned as * kind of board of adjustment attd 
that, therefote, judical review ofiu decision should 
have been accomplished in the same way as review 
of board of adjustment decision!. 
6. By either route, mandamus or review pursuant to 
the statute* the case would have ended up in district 
court, it may be that denominating the proceeding 
as "mandamus* or as A "plenary action* under §10-
9-15 is neither determinative nor 'anything other 
than a technicality which did not adversely affect 
the rights of the parties;" Crist v. Maptetoa City. 
497 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1971) (Crockett, J., disse-
nting). The city apparently believes its decision 
would be entitled to more deference if 
under $ H W 1 than in the context of a 
araus action. Of eouae* whatever mhtfaat benefit 
the county receives by virtue of ft* appeal >MpgJft 
the mandamus context is a direct consequence of the 
city's own questionable procedure for obtaining 4 
conditional use permit. 
7. We note that in taking additional evidence and 
making its detailed findings, the trial cowt ppie a 
fair and disciptioed effort to understand the t$sts 
for the ar / s docision. In no sense did fc venture 
notion $ wfcaeiyaf » $ e keif imerestttfthe citi-
zen*" «fc CkufiMCto. Xanthm * Board 0/Ad> 
UtfmerH,685FS*»(B5/ 
t. That notion fc*r*brays been a hit of to oversta-
tement, Even if jx* strictly required, deference is no 
doubt given when the. trial court1* analysis k illu-
minating. CL 2km Bkm Nml*J Bank v. Nation*! 
Am. Tide Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 198S) 
("Although we may not defer to a trial court's 
conclusion on a legal question, we certainly may 
derive great benefit from the trial judge's views on 
the issue and may be persuaded by those views."). 
In any case, the Utah practice of duplicative, two* 
tiered judicial review of agency action has been time-
consuming and inefficient. The Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act wisely breaks from this approach. 
Informal agency action, where no record is made, 
will be reviewed in district court on a trial drnovo 
basis, in cooaccsto w ^ wrudt a record wiH be 
generated. 
(19*6), 
record ^ 
agency i 
Court. Set 
(19*6). 1 H 
doing 
evaluating* 
records and resoMnglegal issues. 
~~-"4&# 
the curio** ^ 
No. S70154-CA
 M 
FILED; May 13,19ft 
DAVIDSON, JMfe: 
PmM^Mmk taey appeals ftptiTffy 
district court's order which: 1) granted defe-
ndant Joaepb Cesser's motions for satlsftc-
tion of judgtociit and relief from judgment; 
and 2) t^i»^$wipflt motion that tie W*s 
entitled id > Qeftain personal property ' o f 
Gasser's which Brimley had purchticd at a 
sheriffs sale,. 
Although the parties to this appeal iWre a 
lengthy history, it is sufficient to 
M
* y ,»• Wk * * » Brimiejr4*u&»4] 
immmmmmsar 
RULE 41 Rules of Che Utah Supreme CoRrt UTAH COM 
RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF 
LAW BY UNHSD STATES COURTS 
(a) Aethertaattoa la Answer Qairtoni of Law. 
(¥> Proccdarv ta iaveet. 
(e) C^rtfffcsflee Oretr. 
<d) Form oi Ci iUflmlM Or * r ; Saeanadna of Rtcefd. 
(t> Acctptaeee * r ftsjeettea of Ctftificaflae. 
0)F*s*. 
(a) AissMtaalss*** Assrwer Questions of Law. 
H K Utah Supreme Court may in its discretion 
answer a^gwminn of litah law certified to it by a 
court xtigteAMattd Stitet when requested to do so 
tot^suqh certi^wg court acting in accordance with 
th* pwvueons of this Rale, but only if the state of 
the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding before 
the certifying court is uncertain and answering the 
certified question win not unduly interfere with the 
Utah Supreme Court's regular functioning or be 
inconsistent with the timely and orderly development 
of the decisional law of the state. 
(a) Procedure to Invoke* 
Any court referred to in paragraph (a) may 
invoke this Rule by entering an order of certification 
as described in tint Ruler When invoking this Rule, 
the certifying court may .act either sua sponte or 
upon a motion by any party, 
(cTCertlflcatk* Order. 
ft? ft certification order shall be. directed to the 
UtA Supreme Court tod shall state; 
(!) the question oi hrWtp be answered; 
(ii) that the question' certified is a controlling 
issue or law hi a j*0cee&ng pending before the 
cmirying court; tad 
0H) that there appears to be no controlling 
Utah law. 
Q The ofdtf shah* iSo set ferth aO facts which 
are relevant to the Jettfttthisfton of the question 
certified and which v d w fat nature of the contro-
versy, tW context iM w i^ich the question arose, and 
the procedural steps by which the question was 
framed. 
(3) The certifying court may alto include in the 
order any additional reason for its entry of the 
certtficatioa onier tsutt«re«otothefwise apparent. 
(4) *arsa of CertJflcatk* Order; SataWoa of 
Record. 
A certification order shall be prepared by the 
certifymg, court, signed by'the fadge presiding over 
the pr^ctofijog giving rtgLto toe certification order, 
and fdrw>*W to t h e 0 ^ Supreme Court by the 
d
^ ^ ^ ^ & S ^ ^ ^ l offl^  **al. 
certified coptet of aa of laW Mf4M of.ihe record 
before the certifying eourt « n A U with this Court 
if, in the opkdewmm^^'M <t*or* or a 
portJoo thereof'inayW^mosail»r1n determining 
whether to accept the cMffied *aes*km or in answ-
ering that question. 
(e) Acceptance or Rtjeetloa of QitMleatsosi. 
Upon Ming of the certificatioo order and acco-
rapaaying j*pcrrwkii the Oerk; the Court shall 
promptly enter an order ekae? accepting or rejecting 
thequnrtsan o m i f l i d ^ ^ s ^ d ^ ^ X k r t shall the-
reupon serve c o t ^ * f ^ < * u r t * order upon the 
certifying c«m^u^m»fartiet identified in the cer-
tificatioo order; If the Court accepts the question 
for adjudication, the Court wifl sec out m the order 
of acceptance (i) the specific question ^question* 
accepted, (ii) those portions of the record which 
shall be copied and fifed with the Oerk of this 
Court, and (iii) a schedule for the filing of briefs 
and for oral argument by the parties. The form of 
briefs and proceedings on oral argument shall ther-
eafter be governed by Rules 21 and 40 of these 
rules. It may be presumed that the Court will give 
ttiffiiftttfT -fflflfldiiffLfrtt tattm j 
(ft fee*. 
The feet for ffling an otUer of cettlffcatioa in this 
Court shall be the same as for filing and docketing a 
notice of appeal id a civil appeal in the Court, and 
the cost shall be equally divided between the parties 
to the cause unlets otherwise ordered by the certif 
ytng court in itt order of certification. 
(g) AseocteiJe* el CoaeseJ. 
Upon acceptance by the Court of the question of 
law presented by the certification order, counsel for 
the parties not licensed to practice law in the state 
of Utah shall associate a member in good standing 
of the Utah State Bar in connection with all further 
proceedings before the Court. 
(a) Issuance of Optakm oa Certified Questions. 
The Court will issue a written opuuosr that will be 
published and reported. A copy of the opinion shall 
be transmitted by the Oerk under the seal of the 
Court to the csrtifymg court and to the parties ide4 
ntifiedm the certification order. 
TITLE V t JURISDICnON <Hi ,W1IT OF 
CERTIORARI TO COURT OK ACTEALS 
RUU42.RlCTIIWOFJUI>amr^ 
AND DECREES Of? COURT OF ARfKALS 
Unlets otherwise provided by Jaw,'$e review ox jtj 
judgment, an order, and a 0>cree (herein referred/hi 
at 'decisions*) of the Court of Appeals shall b | 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to th£ 
Supreme Courtof Utah. 
RULE 43. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING 
REVIEW OF CERTIORARI 
Review by a writ of certiorari it not a matter of 
right, but of jadfcial discretion, and wffl be granted 
only when there are1 special and important reatona 
therefor. The foflowing, while neither 
nor whoHy measuring the Court's discretion, 
cate the character of reasons that wflt be comidere* 
(I) When a panel of the Court of Appeals hat 
rendered a decision in conflict with** decision of 
another panel of the Court of AppeeJroo the tamjj 
issue of law; 
(2* When, a. panel *f the. Court of Appeals heel 
decsdad a ajuesticw of jaa^txot>ft4tttl sty in a mm 
thalfceiroatfhft with^a e^alsaaa efthiaCewa; 
ffl) WlMat panel of t t e < k s » o&Apftsalt J 
reno>ed *4ecu»0Q that,eat to fe<4ept*te*/ 
the accepted and usual oottest *f jnrtirtis j 
inga or hat to far aanctjtoned each aj 
lower court at to call for ihtce»cia? 
power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals hat decided a* 
important question of ttinnidpei, state, or federll 
law which hat Hot beau but should be, settled ©H 
**>»*! 
RUIA44,COTTIlCAIiONAMK* 
PARTIES 
(a) Jlpnartaca. rtsrfctneg Ft** 1 
SUPREME COURT 78-2-2 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, read "Thereafter, the term of office of a justice 
Supp., 104-2-1; 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986, ch. of the Supreme Court is ten years and until his 
47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4. successor is appointed and approved in accor-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- dance with Section 20-1-7 1" and, in Subsec-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection tion (6), substituted "determines" for "decides" 
(2), rewrote the former second sentence which at the end of the fourth sentence 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or m aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals, 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings, origi-
nating with* 
(I) the Public Service Commission; 
(n) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(IV) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony, 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except the following: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication, 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion m granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
5 
78-2-4 JUDICIAL CODE 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
inder Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 
986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, 
h. 248, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
nent, effective April 25,1988, substituted "for-
aal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in 
Subsection (3)(e); added Subsection (3)(f); re-
designated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3)(i) ac-
cordingly; substituted "(i)" for "(h)" at the end 
of Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
ANALYSIS 
)ocketing statement. 
-Reference to subsection, 
ttted. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
docketing statement 
-Reference to subsection. 
In all cases appealed after January 1, 1987, 
gference in the docketing statement to this 
action will be considered insufficient; instead 
le appropriate subsection must be included to 739 P.2d 634 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
lert the Supreme Court that it has original 
appellate jurisdiction over the case. Gregory v. 
Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 735 P.2d 33 (Utah 
1987). 
Cited in Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 
'8-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Stewart v. Coffinan, 73 Utah Adv. 
ep. 119 (Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
\ Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal 
aw, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137. 
8-2-5. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 248, § 50 repeals ing that the Supreme Court is always open, 
78-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provid- effective April 25, 1988. 
8-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and services of any 
leriff in the state. 
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